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We examine how alumni ties with corporate boards differentially affect male and female 
analysts’ job performance and career outcomes. Connection improves men’s job performance—
forecasting accuracy and recommendation impact—significantly more than women’s . 
Controlling for performance, connection further contributes to men’s, but not women’s, 
likelihood of being voted by institutional investors as “star”  analysts, a marker of career success. 
These asymmetric effects are stronger in more opaque firms and among younger analysts, but is 
absent from a placebo test. Our evidence indicates that men reap higher benefits from social 
networks than women in both job performance and subjective evaluation.  
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“I love my job [as an analyst].  The market does not care whether I am a man or a woman, only 
whether I am right or wrong.”  
 
--Kate Reddy, Sarah Jessica Parker’s character in the comedy “I don’t know how she does it”.  
 
Introduction 
Gender equality ignites impassioned debates. In the past few decades, women have 
advanced significantly in the labor market and education. Not only are they now the majority of 
the American workforce,1 they also out-number men among college graduates (Goldin, Katz, 
and Kuziemko, 2006) and account for half the class in medical and law schools. Despite these 
broad changes, however, the perplexing pattern remains that women are thinly represented at the 
top of the business world: Despite the push by many companies to enhance gender diversity 
especially at the top, the ranks of women among senior corporate officers and company boards 
remain in the single digits and low teens. 2  It thus appears that women’s empowerment in 
education and labor market has not resulted in the breaking of the proverbial “glass ceiling” in 
business.  
This paper explores the idea that the persistent gender gap at the top of the business world 
could at least partially be attributed to the differential way in which men and women benefit 
from—and are even evaluated according to —their connections in the business community .  
The context of our study is Wall Street analysts; we study the interplay between gender, 
connections, job performance and career outcomes in this population. Wall Street is a fascinating 
setting to study these issues for at least three reasons. First, Wall Street traditionally has the 
reputation of being male-dominated. But many Wall Street firms have been actively trying to 
promote gender diversity. Empirically separating the reality versus the myths of Wall Street’s 
1 Economist, Dec 30, 2009. 
2 According to recent Bloomberg reports, in 2012 the proportion of female CFOs in S&P 500 firms reached a record 
high of 10.8%; the proportion of female CEOs was 4%, also a record high. 
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“gender inequality” is a worthy endeavor. Second, information is of paramount value on Wall 
Street, and as has been documented by Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008 and 2010), 
connections—in the form of alumni ties —facilitates the transmission of information, enabling 
connected analysts to make more impactful stock recommendations and mutual fund managers to 
make more profitable trades. Our paper builds on the work of Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy and 
asks whether women and men are able to extract information from their networks to enhance 
their job performance to the same extent. We use the same alumni connections measures used by 
Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2008, 2010). 
Finally, the analyst labor market is fiercely competitive and the stakes are high: winners 
make millions and losers lose their jobs. Yet how analysts are evaluated is vague and largely 
subjective. One of the most important indicators of an analyst’s career success is his/her being 
voted by institutional investors (mutual fund and hedge fund managers) as an “All American” 
analysts (AAs). The voting is organized by the influential Institutional Investor magazine every 
year through an opinion poll among thousands of fund managers. The result of this poll is 
prominently featured in the October issues of the magazine each year. Winners of the AA titles 
are celebrated by their own employers and coveted by rival banks. As a result, the AA title is one 
of the key determinants of analyst compensation: A 2007 compensation survey among analysts 
indicates that AAs on average command three times the pay of other analysts in the same bank. 
As an opinion poll, the determinants of AA election are largely subjective. For example, the 
Institutional Investor asks fund managers to evaluate analysts on a dozen or so dimensions, the 
top of the list include: Industry knowledge, communication, responsiveness, and written reports. 
In contrast, actual forecast accuracy appears near the bottom of the list.3 Several papers find that 
3 See various October issues of the Institutional Investor magazine for details of the AA election criteria. 
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the link between the AA title and future job performance is weak or transient, leading some 
authors to conclude that the AA election is a “popularity contest” (Emery and Li, 2009) .  
Thus for analysts, while earnings forecast accuracy and recommendation impact are 
objective measures of performance, their career outcomes also depend on subjective 
evaluation—voti ng by institutional money managers. How does connection affect both job 
performance and subjective evaluation? How do the effects differ between men and women? 
These are the questions we examine in this paper.  
One challenge in any study of gender effects is of course self-selection and endogeneity. 
Men and women may enter the analyst labor market at the different rates. Their innate quality 
and social networks may be different. They may cover different types of stocks. We address 
endogeneity in a number of ways. First, focusing on the highly competitive analyst profession 
helps alleviates selection bias. While gender differences in risk aversion and competitiveness is 
large in the general population, studies have found that the differences are much smaller once 
knowledge is controlled for (Dwyer et al. (2002)). Kumar (2010) argues that only the most 
competitive women become a financial analyst. In our own analysis, we find that the education 
background and degrees of connection are similar among men and women. In fact a higher 
fraction of female analysts have ivy-league education than male analysts. Second, in addition to 
control for a number of industry and firm effects, our core identification is based on with-in 
analyst variation of social connection. A typical analyst covers 7-8 stocks; among these, the 
analyst on average has an alumni connection with one or two companies’ senior officers or board 
members. Since alumni ties are determined long ago, this within-analyst variation in connection 
is exogenous, allowing us to compare, for the same analyst, the performance differential due to 
connection, and then compare this differential across gender types. Furthermore, to control for 
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heterogeneity across firms (e.g., some firms are more difficult to evaluate than others), we rank 
all analysts covering the same firm in terms of their relative performance. In sum, our approach 
allows us to examine how connections help analysts improve their performance relative to other 
analysts covering the same firm, and examine how this effect differs by gender. 
Our finding suggests that connection improves men’s job performance—forecast 
accuracy and recommendation impact—more than women’s . While connections improve 
forecast accuracy across the board, the marginal effect among men is significantly larger. For 
example, while connections lead to a 3% improvement in accuracy rankings in general, among 
men, there is a further improvement of about 1.8%. The differential impact of connections is 
even more pronounced in recommendation impact. While connections improve male analysts’ 
recommendation impact (2-day cumulative abnormal return) by about 1.2%, the effect is absent 
for female analysts. Thus, our evidence indicates that the effect documented in Cohen, Frazzini, 
and Malloy (2010) whereby analysts obtain useful information through connections is driven by 
male analysts. Furthermore, we find that connection’s differential impact is stronger for firms 
that are informationally opaque and have poor disclosure quality. These results suggest that 
connection as a channel for information transmission is more effective among male analysts than 
female analysts.  
Second, we find that controlling for job performance, connections still directly 
contributes to male analysts’ odds of being elected an AA. This effect is absence among female 
analysts, for whom education and past forecast accuracy are the main determinants. This 
suggests that investors subjectively value connections per se among male analysts but not among 
female analysts. While we cannot completely rule out the possibility that connections are more 
correlated with unobserved skill among men, the conclusion still holds that the asymmetry in the 
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results indicate that male analysts are able to reap more career benefits from connections than 
female analysts. Finally, we find that connections’ differential impact on job performance is 
particularly pronounced among young analysts. Thus men and women’s differential ability to 
capitalize on social connections may explain gender gaps in long-term career trajectories.  
In a fascinating paper examining the professional musicians’ job market, Goldin and 
Rouse (2000) finds evidence for sex-biased hiring. Our conclusion is different. In our sample, we 
do not find sex-biased elections of star analysts. Female analysts represent about 12% of all 
analysts and account for about 14% of AA analysts. Thus they are not under-represented in 
numbers among elected star analysts. The gender gap in our paper is more subtle: there is an 
asymmetry in the factors that drive male and female analysts success; men overall reap more 
benefits from connections than women both in terms of job performance and in terms of 
subjective evaluation by others. We believe these findings help explain the persistent gender gap 
at the top of the business world. Successfully climbing the corporate ladder requires both better 
job performance and favorable subjective evaluations by others. If men are better able to 
capitalize on connections for both objectives, this difference would perpetuate the observed 
gender gap at the top of the business world. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews the literature. Section II 
discusses our data. Section III presents the main empirical findings. Section IV presents 
hypothesis testing and robustness checks. Section V concludes. 
 
I. Gender, Connections, and Performance Evaluation 
A number of papers have shown that women and men differ in their attitude towards risk 
and competition: Women are more risk averse and are more likely to shun competition. Barber 
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and Odean (2001) find that among retail investors, men are more risk-willing in their trading 
behavior than women. Huang and Kisgen (2012) and Levy, Li, and Zhang (2011) both document 
that women executives and board members are less acquisitive than men. Using a well-calibrated 
experiment, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) show that even though men and women exhibit the 
same level of skill towards a task, men are twice as likely as women to embrace competition by 
entering a tournament for the same task. If reaching the top of the business world involves taking 
risks and competing in a series of tournaments, men and women’s differential risk appetite and 
preference for competition helps to explain why so few women reach the top.   
Beyond the gender differences in innate characteristics, women’s endogenous career 
choices and social constraints further contribute to the gender disparity among the business elite. 
Women’s careers are more likely to be interrupted by child bearing and family considerations.  
Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010) show that female MBAs’ earnings lag males’ significantly a 
decade after graduation, despite being nearly identical at the outset of their careers. And this gap 
is largely explained by differences in career interruptions and weekly hours, both of which are in 
turn due to motherhood.  
In our setting, since we focus on Wall Street analysts—one of the most demanding  and 
selective professions—gender difference in risk -preferences and career choices are unlikely to 
fully explain our results. Both men and women in this profession have chosen a highly 
competitive career. Kumar (2010) argue that self-selection means that only the most competitive 
women would enter this career. Dwyer et al. (2002) show that gender difference in risk aversion 
is much smaller among more knowledgeable investors.   
Our paper is related to the literature that examines socialization as a source of gender 
difference in the work place. Athey, Avery, and Zemsky (2000) theorize that if senior employees 
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are more likely to mentor junior employees of the same “type” (e.g., gender or ethnicity), then 
minority employees (such as females) will receive less mentoring. Using a small sample of field 
data, Ibarra (1992) demonstrates that while network positions of men and women exhibit no 
difference once background characteristics are controlled for, men appear better able to use 
network ties to improve their positions in organizations. Our empirical findings echo these 
conclusions: we find that generally men and women are equally connected and skilled; but while 
connections contributes to better job performance and career outcomes for men, it does to a 
much less extent for women.  
 
II. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Detailed data on analysts’ fiscal year-end earnings-per-share (EPS) forecasts and buy/sell 
stock recommendations are obtained from the I/B/E/S database for the years 1993-2009. The 
accuracy of the earnings forecasts and the price impact of their recommendations are used as 
analysts’ performance measures. Analysts’ AA status is manually collected from the October 
issues of the Institutional Investor magazine each year.  
To identify analyst gender, we obtain full names of AA analysts from the Institutional 
Investor magazine. When the name alone is ambiguous, we check the accompanying articles in 
Institutional Investors magazine that describe the analysts. For non-AA analysts, we obtained 
and cross-check gender classification from Kumar (2010), which uses information from the 
analysts registries in Nelson’s directory of investment research.   
To measure analysts’ connections with company officers and directors, we follow Cohen, 
Frazzini, and Malloy (2008 and 2010) and construct alumni ties between analysts and corporate 
insiders. Specifically, we obtain analysts’ education information from Cohen, Frazzini, and 
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Malloy (2010), and officer and directors’ education information from BoardEx. We construct 
three variants of the connection variable. The first measure identifies an analyst as “connected” 
to a company he/she covers if the analyst and one of the officers/directors of the company 
attended the same university (Connect1). The second measure requires that the analyst and 
officer/director attended the same school (e.g., business school) within the university 
(Connect2). 4  In a further refinement, the third definition requires that the analyst and the 
officer/board member attended the same school with overlapping periods (Connect3). Each 
subsequent definition reduces the number of analyst-firm pairs that are considered connected. In 
particular, since analysts are generally younger than corporate officers and board members, 
Connect3 significantly reduces the number of connections in our sample.  
Table 1 reports the number of analysts in our sample and the gender distribution. On 
average we are able to obtain education and connection information for over 650 (580 male and 
78 female) analysts each year, representing about 25% of the overall IBES analyst population. 
Among these, the 78 females represent about 12%. The percentage of female analyst rose and 
fell over the sample period however. Also reported in Table 1 is the number of AA analysts and 
the gender distribution in this sub-sample. On average around 73 analyst each year in our sample 
win the AA title, representing slightly less than 10% of the analyst pool. This percentage is 
consistent with those reported in earlier work (e.g., Fang and Yasuda (2009), (2014)). Among 
AA analysts, females account for about 14% on average, slightly higher than the female pretense 
in the overall analyst sample (11%).  
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of female percentage over time. The percentage of female 
analysts rose from 10% in 1993 to 14% in 1997, before gradually falling back to about 11% by 
2009. There is also a rise and fall in female percentage among star analysts: it rose from 7% in 
4 We considered 6 degrees: MBA, general Masters, PhD, medical degree, law degree, and undergraduate degree. 
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1993 to 22% in 2001, before falling back to 14% by 2009. The graph shows that since 1999, the 
percentage of female analysts among AAs has consistently exceeded the percentage of female 
analysts in the overall sample. Thus, judging from this percentage at least, there is no gender bias 
in the overall star election outcome. 
Table 2 reports statistics on analysts’ connections. Panel A compares connections by 
gender. Using the Connect1 measure, each male analyst is connected to 2.21 stocks that he 
covers on average while each female analyst is connected to 2.33 stocks, slightly higher than the 
male figure, but the difference is not statistically significant over any period of time. Conclusions 
based on the Connect2 measure is the same: male and female analysts are equally connected on 
average. Due to the more stringent requirement for the Connect2 measure, not surprisingly the 
number of connections is smaller across both genders: 1.24 for male and 1.33 for female. 
Turning to Connect3—the measure that requires overlapping school ties, we first note that these 
connections are much more rare for analysts. Male analysts are connected to only 0.13 stocks on 
average and female are connected to 0.08 stocks on average. The rarity of overlapping 
connections is because analysts are generally much younger than corporate officers/directors. 
This is particularly true for female analysts as we show in the next set of statistics that female 
analysts are generally younger than their male counterparts. The gender difference in Connect3 is 
significant in the pooled test across the years, but insignificant for most of the individual years, 
which is the time unit of our analysis below.  
Table 3 reports statistics on analysts demographic and work patterns. Here, male and 
female analysts look significantly different on a number of dimensions. Female analysts appear 
to have stronger education credentials than their male counterparts. A higher fraction of them 
(30%) have attended an Ivy League college compare to men (24%). More of them have MBAs 
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(48%) than men (42%) or other post-graduate degrees (62% versus 60%). To examine 
educational difference more closely, Figure 2a plots the percentage of male/female analysts with 
Ivy League degrees over time. The graph shows that generally the proportion of analysts with 
Ivy League degrees have fallen over time. But the positive gender gap whereby a higher fraction 
of female analysts have Ivy League degrees is a consistent pattern throughout the sample period, 
and the gap is particularly large in the earlier years. Figure 2b plots the corresponding 
percentages among the AA analysts sample. First we note that Ivy-League degrees are 
significantly more common among star analysts (around 60% and 35% for female and male 
analysts, respectively. Second, we continue to see the clear gender gap that a much higher 
fraction of female analysts have Ivy League degrees.  
Table 3 also shows that female analysts tend to work for larger brokers employing more 
analysts than male analysts. They are less experienced, with an average experience of 4.71 years 
compare to male analysts’ 5.14 years. They also have a slightly lower work load, on average 
covering 3.46 industry segments and 15.26 stocks compare to male analysts’ 3.92 industries and 
18.15 stocks. The fact that female analysts have a lower work load is not surprising, given that 
the typical analysts are also in the prime years of child-rearing. This pattern is consistent with the 
evidence in Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010). Since work intensity does affect research quality, 
in our subsequent analysis we are careful to control for these differences.  
Summarizing the basic statistics presented above, we find that generally there is no 
gender gap in analysts’ connectedness. There is also no gender gap in the overall odds for male 
and female analysts to be elected to star analysts. Female analysts appear to have stronger 
education backgrounds than male analysts. But they tend to be less experienced and have a 
slightly lower work load. The similarity between male and female analysts’ connectedness and 
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female analysts’ stronger education attainment alleviate the concern that the patterns we report 
below are due to systematic differences in connections and qualifications. They are also 
consistent with Kumar (2010) that only the most competitive and qualified women enter the 
analyst work force.    
 
III. Main Findings 
To measure analyst forecast accuracy, we follow existing literature (Clement and Tse, 
2005; Kumar, 2010) and compute a standardized forecast accuracy measure as follows:   
(1)        
)Accuracy Rawmin()Accuracy max(Raw
)Accuracy Rawmin(Accuracy Raw
_tan
tj,tj,
tj, tj, i,
 tj, i, −
−
=AccuracydardizedS    
where Raw Accuracyi, j, t is the percentage forecast error (the absolute difference between the 
analyst’s forecast and the actual reported earnings per share, scaled by price) on the forecast 
made by analyst i for firm j in year t, and min(.) and max(.) are the minimum and maximum of 
the Raw Accuracy measures exhibited by all analysts covering the same firm j in the same period 
t, respectively.5 This standardization converts the simple percentage error measure into a ranking: 
All analysts covering the same firm in the same year are ranked relative to one another. Thus it 
removes the heterogeneity in forecast errors across firm-year combinations, and the resulting 
measure is comparable across analysts and firms.6 To calculate the measure, we require that the 
firm is covered by at least 5 analysts in a given year.  
5 We repeated our analysis using a different scaling method, and found qualitatively the same results. The alternative 
scaling converts measures to z-scores by subtracting the variable’s mean and dividing it by it standard deviation. 
6 Unstandardized percentage forecast error may not be comparable across firms and analysts covering them because 
while 5% forecast error may be quite good for a complex and volatile technology company, it may be large for a 
stable and simple utility business. The standardization also reflects investors’ perspective, comparing analysts 
covering the same firm, rather than across firms. 
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To measure the impact of analysts’ stock recommendations, we follow a large body of 
prior literature and focus on the stocks’ 2-day cumulative abnormal returns7 immediately after 
the recommendation change, using the daily Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) 
(DGTW) characteristics-based benchmarks. Specifically:  
(2)          ( )∑
=
−=
1
0
,,]1,0[
τ
ττ ii BrCAR , 
where [0,1] is the 2-day window from the date of the recommendation release to 1-day after, τ,ir  
is the return for stock i on date τ , τ,iB is stock i’s DGTW-benchmarked return on date τ . 
Subtracting the contemporaneous benchmark return from the stock return removes expected 
stock movements associated with stocks’ size, book-to-market ratio, and momentum, leaving 
only firm-specific abnormal returns that reflect market’s reactions to analyst recommendation 
changes.8   
A. Connections and Forecast Accuracy 
Table 4 presents regressions results on forecast accuracy. Panel A, B, and C report results 
using Connect1, Connect2, and Connect3 as measures of analyst-firm connection, respectively. 
Each panel examines four models. Model (1) is the baseline regression, with the male and 
connection variable entering the regressions separately but no interaction effects. Models (2)-(4) 
add in the interaction term between male and connection, a key variable of interest. They differ 
in the fixed effects included in the regressions. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and are clustered at analyst level. 
7 In an earlier version we examined other horizons such as the 30 days after the recommendation date and find 
qualitatively similar results. In this version we focus on the 2-day window since it is more difficult to attribute 
further returns to recommendation as the horizon increases. The 2-day window captures the more relevant price 
impact due to analyst recommendations (Fang and Yasuda (2014)).  
8 The DGTW benchmarks are available via http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/rwermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm. Details of 
the DGTW benchmark construction is discussed in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). 
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Focusing on Panel 1, Model (1) indicates that male analysts have better ranking in 
relative accuracy, and connections are associated with better accuracy (the dependent variable is 
standardized forecast error; the smaller the error, the better). Male analysts are associated with a 
1% better ranking than female analysts (the coefficient on the Male indicator), a small magnitude 
that is statistically significant. Connections are associated with a 4.5% better ranking (the 
coefficient on Connect1), a much larger magnitude that is highly significant. Model (2) adds in 
the interaction terms between male and connection. The interaction term is significantly negative, 
indicating that for male analysts, connection further contributes to better accuracy. The 
coefficient estimate indicates that for male analysts, connection further improves accuracy 
ranking by 1.8%, 60% of the overall effect due to connection (3%). It is also interesting to note 
that once the interaction term is introduced, the magnitude on the male indicator alone becomes 
much smaller, at 0.6%, marginally significant at the 10% level.  
Models (3) and (4) control for different fixed effects and yield the same conclusions. It is 
important to note that the connection variables are constructed at the analyst-firm-year level. 
Thus, the same analyst would have different Connect1 measures for different stocks he/she 
covers. In other words, the connection variable is not picking up cross-sectional variations 
among analysts, but identifies the difference due to connection, even within the analyst. In 
Model (3), analystyear fixed effects are controlled, absorbing variations across analyst-year 
combinations, leaving the connection variable truly picking up the effect due to connection, 
within the same analyst-year. In this specification, the coefficient on the male and connection 
interaction is virtually unchanged, at -1.9%. Finally in Model (4), when we control for firm-year 
fixed effects, the interaction terms remains negative and highly significant, at -1.1%. Overall, 
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these estimates indicate that the “value” of connection for male analysts is abo ut 30% to 60% 
higher than the overall effect, a large economic magnitude. 
Control variables in the regressions generally have the expected sign. For example, star 
analysts and more experienced analysts have better accuracy (albeit insignificant in some 
specifications) but number of firms and industries covered (work intensity) worsens accuracy. 
Panels B and C repeat the analysis using Connect2 and Connect3 and yield similar 
conclusions. Panel B shows that Connect2 is generally associated with a 2% improvement in 
accuracy ranking, and for male analysts, it is associated with a further 1.3%-2% improvement. 
Panel C shows that overlapping connection is more valuable and is associated with an accuracy 
ranking improvement ranging from 5% to 11%. For male analysts, overlapping connections 
result in further accuracy ranking improvements of 5%-6%.  
Summarizing the results in Table 4, we find that connections are associated with a 2%-
6% improvement in accuracy rankings. For male analysts, connections are associated with a 
further 1.3%-5% improvement in accuracy rankings. The finding that connections are valuable 
and improves job performance for analysts is not new and consistent with Cohen, Frazzini, and 
Malloy (2010). Our new insight is that the “value” of connections seems substantially higher  
(about 60%) for male analysts than female analysts.  
B. Connections and Recommendation Impact  
Tables 5 and 6 study the impact of connections on buy and sell stock recommendations 
respectively. The organization of both tables are similar to Table 4. In Panels A, B, and C, we 
report results using Connect1, Connect2, and Connect3, respectively. Each panel consists of four 
models, same as the four specifications in Table 4.  
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Model (1) in Table 5 shows that connections are associated with stronger price impact on 
buy recommendations. The magnitude ranges from 0.9% (Panel A, Connect1) to 1.2% (Panel C, 
Connect3). These estimates are not only highly significant statistically, but also large in 
economic terms. It is also interesting to note that the effect is larger for overlapping connections, 
as we would expect. We also find that male analysts generally have higher price impact on buy 
recommendations; the magnitude is a consistent 0.4% across the three connection measures. In 
Model (2), which adds in the male and connection interaction term, the overall effect on the 
connection variables become completely insignificant (and even turning negative in some cases), 
but the male and connection interaction terms are highly significant, with coefficients ranging 
from 1.2% (Connect1, Panel A), to 1.7% (Connect3, Panel C). These results indicate that while 
connections are valuable and enhance analysts’ price impact—as reported in Cohen, Frazzini, 
and Malloy, this effect is completely driven by male analysts and not present in female analysts.  
Once again it is important to point out that the coefficient estimates are consistent across 
models and connection variables. The effect is present with similar magnitudes even in Model (3) 
which controls for analyst-year fixed effects, and as such, the coefficients identify within analyst 
variations due to connections.  
Combining the evidence here with Table 4, we reach a consistent conclusion that 
connections benefit male analysts more than they do female analysts as a job-performance 
enhancer. Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010) argue that social networks help improve analysts 
job performance because they facilitate information transmission. Our evidence suggest that 
connection as an information transmission channel is more effective for male analysts than 
female analysts.  
16 
 
Table 6 repeats the analysis for sell recommendations. Contrary to the buy 
recommendation results in Table 5, there is no effect associated with either connections or 
gender. The weaker results for sell recommendations is consistent with a number of prior studies 
(e.g., Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010) which examine analyst connections and Fang and 
Yasuda (2014) which examines star status).9  
Overall, the analysis of earnings forecast and stock recommendations leads to the clear 
conclusion that connections matter; but more importantly, male analysts are better able to use 
connections to improve their job performance than female analysts.  
C. Connections and AA Election 
  In this section we explore the impact of connections on the odds of being elected by 
institutional investors as an AA analyst. The evidence in the last two sub-sections shows that 
connections have a differential impact on job performance: Male analysts appear better able to 
translate connections into more accurate forecasts and impactful recommendations. To the extent 
that investors care about these performance metrics, connection alone should not further affect an 
analyst’s odds of being elected. This is our null hypothesis. If connections per se affect an 
analyst’s election probability above and beyond performance measures, it would indicate either 
that connections are correlated with unobserved analysts traits that are valued by investors, or 
that investors subjectively value connections as an attribute. 
 Table 7 reports probit regression results examining AA election outcomes. Equations (1) 
and (2) examine elections among male analysts and equations (3) and (4) examine elections 
9 A number of factors can explain the asymmetry between buy and sell recommendations. First, analysts’ main 
clients are investors such as mutual funds. The majority of this buy-side clientele have some restrictions on short-
selling, making negative views less of a research focus by analysts. Second, firms (and insiders) are more wary of 
disclosing material negative information, and the associated litigation risk. The litigation risk is less severe for 
positive views. Thus negative private information is less likely to be passed on by social connections than positive 
opinions. 
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among female analysts. We examine two outcome variables: One is being elected as an AA, 
whether or not the analyst was an AA in the previous year or not. The other is being promoted to 
AA status, conditioned on not being an AA in the previous year.  
 Table 7 Panel A indicates that different factors matter in the election of male and female 
star analysts. For male analysts, connections contribute significantly to being elected or 
promoted as an AA. The economic magnitude is such that being connected has about 1.5% 
higher probability of being elected as AA or being promoted to AA. Number of stocks covered 
also contributes positively to the AA election. The number of industries covered has a negative 
impact, possibly because as analysts cover more sectors, their insights into a specific sector 
becomes less valuable, or as their focus widens, quality of research is negatively affected. 
Interestingly, forecast accuracy and recommendation impact do not affect AA outcomes in any 
significant way, even though the signs are as expected. In sharp contrast, the results for female 
analysts show that Ivy League degrees significantly increases the odds of being elected as AA by 
5%.. Ivy League degree could be proxying for unobserved competence/skill. As with male 
analysts, covering more stocks is also rewarded for female analysts. Forecast accuracy is 
important as well: Inaccurate forecasts in the past reduce the chance of being elected. However, 
the connection variable per se is not significant in affecting the odds of being elected a star in the 
female population, unlike in the male analysts sample. Panel B and C show that our findings are 
robust using Connect2 and Connect3.  
 The evidence in Table 7 suggests that different factors matter for male and female 
analysts’ odds of being elected an AA, the ultimate career success symbol among analysts. 
Connections increase male analysts’ odds of being elected, but they do not affect female analysts 
odds. In contrast, for female analysts, education (which could be a proxy for skill) and past 
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performance (accuracy) matters. We are not able to distinguish whether connections are 
correlated with unobservable analyst characteristics that are valued by investors, or whether 
investors perceive analysts’ connections as a valuable attribute in itself. In either case, however, 
the asymmetric result in the male and female sample indicates that male analysts benefits more 
directly from connections than female analysts do. 
 
IV.  Additional Analyses  
In this section, we present additional analyses that help us test hypotheses regarding why 
connection matters differentially for male and female analysts.   
A. Quality of information 
As we argued before, one explanation for the differential effect of connections is that 
male analysts are better able to capitalize on their social networks and obtain useful information. 
If this is the case, connections’ differential effects should be are more pronounced in firms whose 
disclosure is poor and information is more opaque. To test this hypothesis, we examine four 
information proxies. The first is a financial reporting quality measure based on Dechow and 
Dechiv (2002). It is the standard deviation of unexplained accruals; a larger variability of 
unexplained accruals indicates lower financial reporting quality. We multiply the measure by 
negative 1 so that a high measure indicates high reporting quality. The second measure is 10-K 
disclosure quality, which is based on textual analysis of 10-Ks. It is from Li (2008). In addition, 
we use stock volatility and asset tangibility as measure of the firms’ information environment. 
The value of private information is higher for volatile and opaque firms that are harder to 
understand and predict.  
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Using each measure, we sort stocks into high and low information quality, and re-
estimate the regressions in Tables 4 and 6 in the sub-samples, and then compare the key 
coefficients. Table 8 Panel A reports results on earnings forecast accuracy (similar to Table 4); 
Panel B reports results on recommendation impact (similar to Table 6). For brevity, we report 
result using Connect1. Using other measures yields similar results. Panel A shows that as in 
Table 4, connection improves forecast accuracy across the board. There is generally no gender 
difference in accuracy: the male coefficient is mostly insignificant. The interaction term between 
male and connections is always negative and significant, but its magnitude and statistical 
significance is higher among firms with low information quality and high opaqueness. Formal 
tests of coefficient equality across equations indicate that the differences in coefficients between 
the high- and low-information quality samples are significant. The evidence is consistent with 
the notion that male analysts are better able to use connections for useful information.  
Results in Panel B reinforce this conclusion. Consistent with Table 6, neither connection 
itself nor the male indicator is significant in explaining recommendation impact. The only effect 
of connections loads on the interaction term between the two. Importantly across firms sorted by 
information quality, the coefficient is at least twice as large among opaque firms with low 
information quality than in firms with high information quality.  
Overall the findings of this section provide strong support that information channel plays 
a key role in explaining the differential effect of connection on job performance between genders.  
B. Young vs. old analysts 
If male and female analysts have differential abilities to capitalize on networks, we 
expect this effect to be particularly pronounced among young analysts, who have not yet built up 
sufficient human capital of their own and for whom connections may matter materially.  
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To test this hypothesis, we split the analyst sample into young and old analysts based on 
the median experience of 5 years and repeat the baseline regression in the two sub-samples. 
Table 9 reports the results based on all three connection measures. Results in this table show that 
connections are important for both old and young analysts. Their coefficients are generally larger 
in the old analyst sample, suggesting the long lasting value of connections. However the 
interaction term between gender and connection are generally not significant in the older analyst 
sample but large and significant in the young analyst sample. Connections help young male 
analysts improve forecast accuracy from 2.6% (Connect1) to 7.8% (Connect3), highly significant 
and economically large. Thus the evidence suggests that as we hypothesized, connections 
differential impact on job performance is even stronger among young analysts than old analysts. 
This is important as young analysts’ differential ability to capitalize on connections could lead to 
long term differences in career trajectories. 
C. Placebo test: A different star-selection  
We have shown that connections matter differentially for male and female analysts in the 
subjective evaluation of analysts by institutional investors. The AA voting analysis shows that 
connections per se is valued for male analysts above and beyond job performance, but is it not 
for female analysts.  
Does this mean that investors use different criteria when evaluating male and female 
analysts? After all, connections may matter for male analysts because they are more correlated 
with unobservable skill for men than for women. But note that this explanation still suggests that 
men are better able to use connections than women in unobservable ways. However, to 
differentiate between these two possibilities, we turn to a different star-ranking, from the Wall 
Street Journal. Since 1992, the Journal publishes its own annual “Best on the Street” list of top 
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analysts. Unlike the Institutional Investor AA list which is based on investor voting, Wall Street 
Journal’s ranking is algorithm-based and computerized. A research company named FactSet 
Research Systems collects, verifies the underlying data on stock recommendations made by 
analysts, and computes an aggregate numerical score for each analyst’s performance made 
through the past 12 months, taking into account analysts’ buy/hold/sell calls. While the exact 
algorithm is not disclosed, the Wall Street Journal’s description of the process emphasizes its 
“objectivity, accuracy, and fairness”. If connection’s differential effect on AA elections reflect a 
bias in investors subjective evaluation of analysts, then we should not observe this same 
asymmetry in Wall Street Journals’ computerized ranking. 
We obtained Wall Street Journal “Best on the Street” rankings for the period 1999- 2009, 
and re-estimate the probit regression using this star-analyst list. Table 10 reports the results. 
Contrary to the AA election results in Table 7, we see that the factors affecting the outcome is 
largely symmetric in the male and female sub-samples. In particular, past forecast errors reduce 
the odds of being top-ranked for both male and female analysts, while number of stocks covered 
by rewarded in both samples. It is interesting to note that the WSJ ranking is less persistent than 
the AA election: Last WSJ top ranking does not explain current ranking, but past AA ranking has 
a huge impact on current ranking (Table 7).  
Thus, results in this table provide at least suggestive evidence that the asymmetry in the 
AA election outcome reflects the differential way in which investors subjectively evaluate male 
and female analysts.  
D. Same-sex Connections 
It has often been argued (anecdotally at least) that the observed gender difference in high 
places in business reflects a “basis problem”: If only there are more female officers and directors, 
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the female executive network will further promote more female presence, closing the gender gap. 
In our context, this hypothesis suggests that the differential impact of connections for male and 
female analysts is partially due to the paucity of female executives; female analysts’ connections 
are weaker as they would benefit more from same-sex connections.  
To test this hypothesis, we replace the connection variable with three gender-classified 
connectons: Male-Male; Male-Female, and Female-Female. The male-female connection is 
where the analyst is a male and he is connected to a female executive. Results are reported in 
Table 11. Consistent with the basis hypothesis, we see that the Female-Female connection does 
translate into significantly better job performance: a 2.5% improvement on the relative accuracy 
ranking (compared to the 2% overall improvement found in Table 4). However the evidence 
shows that the Male-Male connection translates into an even larger, 4.7% improvement. 
Furthermore, on stock recommendations, while the Male-Male connections translate into a 1.1% 
improvement in price impact, the Female-Female connections effect is a positive 0.4%, albeit 
insignificant. The weaker significance of the Female-Female connection could be due to small 
sample: only 4% of connections are Female-Female; 80% are Male-Male. However the evidence 
suggests that while addressing the basis problem might help closing the gender gap, the “old 
boys club” has an undeniable strength.  
 
E. Heckman Correction 
In our final robustness check, we explicitly address the concern that our results may be 
driven by the endogenous self-selection of analysts covering different stocks. In our regressions, 
we have used numerous techniques to address endogeneity, including using the standardized 
performance ranks, and controlling for a combination of analyst, industry, firm and year fixed 
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effects. In this section, we use the Heckman 2-stage technique to explicit address the endogenous 
mapping between analysts and firms they cover.  
To implement the Heckman procedure, we first regress the percentage of female analysts 
covering a firm on exogenous factors that could otherwise affect female participation in covering 
that firm. Our key instrumental variable is the female labor force participation rate in the county 
where company is head-quartered in 1990, the beginning of our sample period. While this 
variable is likely to affect female analysts’ presence in covering the firm, it is unlikely to affect 
individual analysts’ performance and furthermore how connections affect the performance. In 
Panel A of Table 12, indeed we find that female labor force participation significantly predicts 
the percentage of female analysts coving the firm. In addition, we also find that larger firms and 
value (high book-to-market) firms tend to have higher female coverage. 
We then compute the inverse Mill’s ratio from the first stage and include it as an 
additional variable in the second-stage regression. In Panel B, we find that our main result—
namely that the interaction term between male and connections significantly reduces forecast 
error and increase recommendation price impact—remain true after the endogeneity correction.  
 
V. Conclusions 
Connections help people relate to each other and in the finance profession, they facilitate 
the transmission of useful information. Using a sample of Wall Street analysts, we document that 
the extent to which male and female analysts benefit from their connections is different. 
Connections help male analysts improve their forecast accuracy more than in the overall 
population. Connections increase male analysts’ recommendation price impact but this effect is 
absent for female analysts. These effects are stronger in firms with more opaque information 
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environment, indicating that the effectiveness of social connections as information channels 
differs across gender.  
Furthermore, controlling for job performance, connections per se significantly enhances 
male analysts’ odds of being voted as star analysts by institutional investors, while they have no 
effect on female analysts’ odds. For female analysts, education and job performance are 
significant predictors of election probability. We provide an intriguing piece of evidence that the 
asymmetric effect of connection on star-status is absent in another, algorithm-based analyst 
ranking. This suggests that investors subjectively value connections among men more than they 
do among women. Finally, the asymmetric impact of connections on performance is especially 
evident among young analysts.  
We believe our findings can help explain the persistent gap in long term career 
trajectories between young male and female workers, and by implication, ultimately the stubborn 
gender gap at the top of the business world. Young graduates out of college or business school 
have similar credentials regardless of gender; in our sample, if anything, the female analysts on 
the margin have higher education attainment. However if men are better able to capitalize on 
connections for job performance and career gains, especially when young, it could set off a self-
reinforcing cycle, maintaining and enlarging the gender gap observed later.  
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Figure 1 Gender Distribution 
This figure plots the percentage of female analysts in the overall analyst pool and the star (AA) analyst pool. AA 
analysts are identified from the October issues of the Institutional Investor magazine.  
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Figure 2 Comparing Education 
This figure plots the fraction of male and female analysts who have ever attended an Ivy League school. Star 
analysts are identified from the October issues of the Institutional Investor magazine. 
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Table 1 Gender Distribution  
 
This table reports the percentage of female analysts in the overall analyst pool and the star (AA) analyst pool. Star 
analysts are identified from the October issues of the Institutional Investor magazine.  
 
  All Analysts   Star Analysts 
Year Male Female % Female 
 
Male Female % Female 
1993 215 24 10.04% 
 
53 4 7.02% 
1994 264 34 11.41% 
 
59 5 7.81% 
1995 302 42 12.21% 
 
65 8 10.96% 
1996 364 50 12.08% 
 
63 7 10.00% 
1997 432 70 13.94% 
 
68 10 12.82% 
1998 506 72 12.46% 
 
79 10 11.24% 
1999 554 83 13.03% 
 
81 12 12.90% 
2000 609 91 13.00% 
 
78 17 17.89% 
2001 642 88 12.05% 
 
60 17 22.08% 
2002 681 92 11.90% 
 
67 15 18.29% 
2003 762 104 12.01% 
 
61 14 18.67% 
2004 859 108 11.17% 
 
51 12 19.05% 
2005 937 127 11.94% 
 
53 8 13.11% 
2006 832 109 11.58% 
 
60 9 13.04% 
2007 722 92 11.30% 
 
59 8 11.94% 
2008 633 76 10.72% 
 
62 10 13.89% 
2009 548 64 10.46% 
 
47 8 14.55% 
Average 580 78 11.75%  63 10 14.03% 
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Table 2 Connection Statistics 
 
This table presents statistics on analyst connections. Connect1 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if an analyst 
covering a stock attended the same university as one of the officers/directors of the company. Connect2 is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if an analyst covering a stock attended the same degree program in the same 
university as one of the officers/directors of the company. Connect3 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if an 
analyst covering a stocks attended in the same degree program in the same university as one of the officers/directors 
of the company over overlapping periods. P-values from t-tests of equality are reported. 
 
Panel A: Number of connections by gender 
 
Connect1 
 
Connect2 
 
Connect3 
Year Male Female 
p-value 
(diff.=0) 
  Male Female 
p-value 
(diff.=0) 
  Male Female 
p-value 
(diff.=0) 
1993 1.73 1.54 0.73 
 
0.93 0.88 0.87 
 
0.07 0.08 0.84 
1994 1.59 1.38 0.67 
 
0.83 0.65 0.52 
 
0.06 0.06 0.98 
1995 1.70 1.67 0.94 
 
0.89 0.83 0.84 
 
0.08 0.02 0.39 
1996 1.62 1.74 0.77 
 
0.87 0.96 0.75 
 
0.09 0.04 0.39 
1997 1.53 1.61 0.82 
 
0.87 0.97 0.66 
 
0.10 0.03 0.18 
1998 1.48 1.96 0.15 
 
0.88 1.11 0.32 
 
0.10 0.07 0.60 
1999 1.71 2.29 0.05 
 
0.99 1.39 0.07 
 
0.13 0.12 0.90 
2000 1.89 2.35 0.14 
 
1.06 1.47 0.05 
 
0.14 0.11 0.65 
2001 2.10 2.67 0.07 
 
1.22 1.56 0.12 
 
0.14 0.14 0.96 
2002 2.19 2.42 0.47 
 
1.27 1.38 0.61 
 
0.15 0.13 0.75 
2003 2.30 2.01 0.34 
 
1.31 1.14 0.43 
 
0.14 0.08 0.26 
2004 2.47 2.26 0.53 
 
1.39 1.32 0.77 
 
0.15 0.06 0.15 
2005 2.54 2.45 0.76 
 
1.41 1.35 0.75 
 
0.15 0.07 0.13 
2006 2.89 3.00 0.75 
 
1.59 1.56 0.88 
 
0.16 0.08 0.18 
2007 3.20 3.37 0.67 
 
1.75 1.75 1.00 
 
0.19 0.08 0.12 
2008 3.14 3.28 0.74 
 
1.72 1.78 0.84 
 
0.17 0.04 0.08 
2009 3.32 3.30 0.97 
 
1.83 1.67 0.62 
 
0.15 0.05 0.13 
Average 2.21 2.33 0.21   1.24 1.30 0.31   0.13 0.08 0.00 
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Table 2 Connection Statistics, Continued 
 
Panel B: Number of connections by star status 
 
Connect1 
 
Connect2 
 
Connect3 
Year AA Non-AA 
p-value 
(diff.=0) 
  AA Non-AA 
p-value 
(diff.=0) 
  AA Non-AA 
p-value 
(diff.=0) 
1993 2.65 1.42 0.00 
 
1.40 0.77 0.01 
 
0.12 0.05 0.16 
1994 2.59 1.28 0.00 
 
1.39 0.65 0.00 
 
0.09 0.05 0.34 
1995 2.96 1.35 0.00 
 
1.64 0.68 0.00 
 
0.15 0.05 0.03 
1996 3.16 1.33 0.00 
 
1.71 0.72 0.00 
 
0.16 0.07 0.09 
1997 3.23 1.24 0.00 
 
1.96 0.68 0.00 
 
0.21 0.07 0.01 
1998 2.96 1.28 0.00 
 
1.96 0.72 0.00 
 
0.20 0.07 0.01 
1999 3.53 1.49 0.00 
 
2.17 0.85 0.00 
 
0.28 0.10 0.00 
2000 3.81 1.66 0.00 
 
2.26 0.93 0.00 
 
0.29 0.11 0.00 
2001 4.53 1.89 0.00 
 
2.77 1.08 0.00 
 
0.42 0.11 0.00 
2002 4.24 1.98 0.00 
 
2.68 1.12 0.00 
 
0.37 0.13 0.00 
2003 4.12 2.09 0.00 
 
2.57 1.17 0.00 
 
0.27 0.12 0.04 
2004 4.44 2.31 0.00 
 
2.73 1.29 0.00 
 
0.43 0.12 0.00 
2005 5.11 2.37 0.00 
 
3.05 1.30 0.00 
 
0.57 0.12 0.00 
2006 4.77 2.75 0.00 
 
2.87 1.49 0.00 
 
0.45 0.13 0.00 
2007 4.84 3.07 0.00 
 
2.93 1.64 0.00 
 
0.39 0.16 0.01 
2008 4.11 3.04 0.01 
 
2.40 1.65 0.01 
 
0.26 0.15 0.14 
2009 4.31 3.22 0.04 
 
2.36 1.76 0.08 
 
0.15 0.14 0.96 
Average 3.83 2.04 0.00   2.29 1.12 0.00   0.28 0.11 0.00 
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Table 3 Demographic and Work Patterns 
 
This table reports demographic and work patterns by analyst gender. Ivy League is an indicator variable that equals 1 
if the analyst has ever attended an Ivy League school and 0 otherwise. Number of qualifications is the number of 
college degrees an analyst has. Postgrad Degree is a dummy equal to one if an analyst holds at least one 
postgraduate degree. MBA degree is a dummy equal to one if an analyst holds MBA degree. Number of Stocks 
Covered is the number of firms for which an analyst provides earnings per share (EPS) forecasts. Number of Ind 
Covered is the number of industries that an analyst cover, where industry is defined based on Fama-French 48 
industries classification. Brokerage size is the number of analysts working for the brokerage firm that the analyst 
works for. Experience is the number of years since an analyst first appears in the I/B/E/S database.  P-values from t-
test for differences are reported.  
 
    
Male Female 
p-value 
(diff.=0) 
Ivy League 0.24 0.30 0.00 
Number of qualifications 1.62 1.64 0.00 
Postgrad Degree 0.60 0.62 0.00 
MBA degree 0.42 0.48 0.00 
Num of Stocks Covered 18.15 15.26 0.00 
Num of Ind Covered 3.92 3.46 0.00 
Brokerage Size 14.68 16.43 0.00 
Experience 5.14 4.71 0.00 
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Table 4 Connection and Forecast Accuracy 
 
This table examines the effect of connections on analysts’ forecast accuracy. The dependent variables is the 
standardized percentage forecast error, calculated as the absolute forecast error scaled by price, standardized across 
analysts covering the same firm same year (Equation (1)). Connect1, Connect2, and Connect3 are as defined in 
Table 2. Male is an indicator variable that equals one for male analysts and zero for female analysts. Ivy League is 
an indicator variable that equals one if the analyst attended one of the Ivy League schools and zero otherwise. All 
Star is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the forecast is made by an AA analyst and 0 otherwise. Experience is the 
number of years the analyst appears in the I/B/E/S database. Brokerage size is the number of analysts working for 
the brokerage firm employing the analyst. Number of Ind Covered is the number of Fama-French industries 
represented by the firms the analyst covers in the year.  Number of Stocks Covered is the number of stocks the 
analyst covers in the year. Size is the natural log of market capitalization of equity.  BTM is the natural log of the 
book-to-market ratio of the stock. Past Returns is the natural log of the past 12-month return of the stock. Constants 
are included but not reported in the regression. All explanatory variables are standardizes as in Equation (1). 
Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at analyst level. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Results using Connect1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Fore Error Fore Error Fore Error Fore Error 
         
Connect1 -0.045 -0.030 -0.029 -0.034 
 
(-3.916)*** (-5.454)*** (-5.491)*** (-6.585)*** 
Male -0.010 -0.006 
 
-0.006 
 
(-3.442)*** (-1.847)* 
 
(-2.058)** 
Male*Connect1 
 
-0.018 -0.019 -0.011 
  
(-3.093)*** (-3.329)*** (-2.119)** 
All Star -0.004 -0.004 
 
-0.003 
 
(-1.521) (-1.565) 
 
(-1.275) 
Ivy League -0.002 -0.002 
 
-0.001 
 
(-0.920) (-0.909) 
 
(-0.693) 
Experience 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 
(1.500) (1.482) (-2.083)** (-2.119)** 
Brokerage Size 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 
 
(1.961)* (1.900)* (1.311) (0.955) 
Num of Ind Covered 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.006 
 
(3.848)*** (3.798)*** (2.365)** (3.087)*** 
Num of Stocks Covered 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 
 
(2.299)** (2.329)** (2.311)** (1.964)** 
Size -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.021 
 
(-17.522)*** (-17.511)*** (-18.271)*** (-13.451)*** 
BTM 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.028 
 
(20.187)*** (20.163)*** (21.000)*** (18.266)*** 
Past Returns -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 
 
(-28.470)*** (-28.490)*** (-28.485)*** (-25.742)*** 
     Observations 381,556 381,556 381,556 381,556 
R-squared 0.024 0.024 0.034 0.051 
Fixed Effects Year+Industry Year+Industry Year+Industry+Analyst Year+Firm 
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Table 4 Connection and Forecast Accuracy, Continued 
 
Panel B: Results using Connect2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Connect2 -0.039 -0.020 -0.020 -0.024 
 
(-6.581)*** (-2.872)*** (-3.204)*** (-3.549)*** 
Male -0.009 -0.006 
 
-0.006 
 
(-3.167)*** (-2.140)** 
 
(-2.306)** 
Male*Connect2 
 
-0.022 -0.020 -0.013 
  
(-3.064)*** (-2.991)*** (-1.873)* 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 381,556 381,556 381,556 381,556 
R-squared 0.022 0.022 0.033 0.050 
Fixed Effects Year+Industry Year+Industry Year+Industry+Analyst Year+Firm 
     Panel C: Results using Connect3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Connect3 -0.111 -0.055 -0.061 -0.045 
 
(-4.061)*** (-2.189)** (-3.065)*** (-2.307)** 
Male -0.008 -0.007 
 
-0.006 
 
(-2.934)*** (-2.739)*** 
 
(-2.507)** 
Male*Connect3 
 
-0.061 -0.055 -0.067 
  
(-2.406)** (-2.684)*** (-3.346)*** 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 381,556 381,556 381,556 381,556 
R-squared 0.022 0.022 0.033 0.050 
Fixed Effects Year+Industry Year+Industry Year+Industry+Analyst Year+Firm 
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Table 5 Connections and Buy Recommendations 
 
This table examines the effect of connections on analysts’ buy recommendation impact. The dependent variables is 
the CAR [0,1], 2-day cumulative abnormal return immediately after the release of the analyst recommendation. 
Connect1, Connect2, and Connect3 are as defined in Table 2. Male is an indicator variable that equals one for male 
analysts and zero for female analysts. Ivy League is an indicator variable that equals one if the analyst attended one 
of the Ivy League schools and zero otherwise. All Star is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the forecast is made by 
an AA analyst and 0 otherwise. Experience is the number of years the analyst appears in the I/B/E/S database. 
Brokerage size is the number of analysts working for the brokerage firm employing the analyst. Number of Ind 
Covered is the number of Fama-French industries represented by the firms the analyst covers in the year.  Number of 
Stocks Covered is the number of stocks the analyst covers in the year. Size is the natural log of market capitalization 
of equity.  BTM is the natural log of the book-to-market ratio of the stock. Past Returns is the natural log of the past 
12-month return of the stock. Constants are included but not reported in the regression. All explanatory variables are 
standardizes as in Equation (1). Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at analyst level. 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Results Using Connect1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] 
         
Connect1 0.009 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 
(8.828)*** (-0.741) (-0.729) (-0.409) 
Male 0.004 0.001 
 
0.002 
 
(3.484)*** (1.016) 
 
(1.337) 
Male*Connect1 
 
0.012 0.013 0.011 
  
(4.884)*** (4.206)*** (4.599)*** 
All Star 0.002 0.002 
 
0.002 
 
(2.083)** (2.234)** 
 
(1.872)* 
Ivy League 0.001 0.001 
 
0.001 
 
(0.955) (0.864) 
 
(1.538) 
Experience 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 
(2.850)*** (2.745)*** (-1.377) (3.292)*** 
Brokerage Size 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.003 
 
(2.568)** (2.569)** (0.262) (2.843)*** 
Num of Ind Covered -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 
(-1.951)* (-2.015)** (-0.456) (-1.710)* 
Num of Stocks Covered -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
 
(-2.964)*** (-2.951)*** (-3.309)*** (-2.715)*** 
Size -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.009 
 
(-6.954)*** (-6.911)*** (-7.291)*** (-9.588)*** 
BTM 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 
 
(1.966)** (1.911)* (1.714)* (-0.334) 
Past Returns 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(3.679)*** (3.685)*** (3.364)*** (3.698)*** 
     Observations 29,302 29,302 29,302 29,302 
R-squared 0.030 0.031 0.091 0.169 
Fixed Effects Year+Industry Year+Industry Year+Industry+Analyst Year+Firm 
36 
 
Table 5 Connections and Buy Recommendations, Continued 
 
Panel B: Results using Connect2 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] 
          
Connect2 0.010 0.000 0.001 -0.000 
 
(8.642)*** (0.138) (0.220) (-0.067) 
Male 0.004 0.003 
 
0.003 
 
(3.489)*** (2.266)** 
 
(2.304)** 
Male*Connect2 
 
0.011 0.009 0.011 
  
(3.452)*** (2.582)*** (3.767)*** 
     Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 29,302 29,302 29,302 29,302 
R-squared 0.029 0.030 0.090 0.168 
Fixed Effects Year+Industry Year+Industry Year+Industry+Analyst Year+Firm 
Panel C: Results using Connect3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] 
    
Connect3 0.012 -0.004 -0.008 -0.004 
 
(3.148)*** (-0.566) (-1.974)** (-0.664) 
Male 0.004 0.004 
 
0.004 
 
(3.366)*** (3.241)*** 
 
(3.418)*** 
Male*Connect3 
 
0.017 0.022 0.019 
  
(2.242)** (3.445)*** (2.593)*** 
     Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 29,302 29,302 29,302 29,302 
R-squared 0.027 0.027 0.088 0.166 
Fixed Effects Year+Industry Year+Industry Year+Industry+Analyst Year+Firm 
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Table 6 Connections and Sell Recommendations 
 
This table examines the effect of connections on analysts’ sell recommendation impact. The dependent variables is 
the CAR [0,1], 2-day cumulative abnormal return immediately after the release of the analyst recommendation. 
Connect1, Connect2, and Connect3 are as defined in Table 2. Male is an indicator variable that equals one for male 
analysts and zero for female analysts. Ivy League is an indicator variable that equals one if the analyst attended one 
of the Ivy League schools and zero otherwise. All Star is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the forecast is made by 
an AA analyst and 0 otherwise. Experience is the number of years the analyst appears in the I/B/E/S database. 
Brokerage size is the number of analysts working for the brokerage firm employing the analyst. Number of Ind 
Covered is the number of Fama-French industries represented by the firms the analyst covers in the year.  Number of 
Stocks Covered is the number of stocks the analyst covers in the year. Size is the natural log of market capitalization 
of equity.  BTM is the natural log of the book-to-market ratio of the stock. Past Returns is the natural log of the past 
12-month return of the stock. Constants are included but not reported in the regression. All explanatory variables are 
standardizes as in Equation (1). Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at analyst level. 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Results using Connect1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] 
         
Connect1 -0.002 0.000 0.003 0.001 
 
(-1.582) (0.047) (0.680) (0.234) 
Male -0.002 -0.001 
 
0.000 
 
(-0.707) (-0.398) 
 
(0.023) 
Male*Connect1 
 
-0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
  
(-0.685) (-0.902) (-0.750) 
All Star 0.002 0.002 
 
-0.001 
 
(1.359) (1.356) 
 
(-0.354) 
Ivy League 0.001 0.001 
 
0.000 
 
(0.456) (0.469) 
 
(0.303) 
Experience -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 
 
(-2.422)** (-2.408)** (-2.492)** (-2.722)*** 
Brokerage Size -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 
(-1.395) (-1.401) (-1.097) (-1.788)* 
Num of Ind Covered 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.929) (0.936) (0.104) (0.381) 
Num of Stocks Covered 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 
 
(2.195)** (2.197)** (2.565)** (2.443)** 
Size 0.006 0.006 0.005 -0.017 
 
(12.791)*** (12.791)*** (8.922)*** (-9.490)*** 
BTM 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.002 
 
(8.089)*** (8.088)*** (6.673)*** (1.087) 
Past Returns 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
(7.242)*** (7.238)*** (5.751)*** (6.014)*** 
     
Observations 28,407 28,407 28,407 28,407 
R-squared 0.040 0.040 0.118 0.272 
Fixed Effects Year+Industry Year+Industry Year+Industry+Analyst Year+Firm 
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Table 6 Connections and Sell Recommendations, Continued 
 
Panel B: Results using Connect2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] 
         
Connect2 -0.001 0.000 0.004 0.003 
 
(-0.736) (0.027) (0.727) (0.516) 
Male -0.002 -0.001 
 
-0.000 
 
(-0.697) (-0.588) 
 
(-0.107) 
Male*Connect2 
 
-0.002 -0.004 -0.003 
  
(-0.299) (-0.750) (-0.591) 
         
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 28,407 28,407 28,407 28,407 
R-squared 0.040 0.040 0.118 0.272 
Fixed Effects Year+Industry Year+Industry Year+Industry+Analyst Year+Firm 
Panel C: Results using Connect3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] 
    
Connect3 0.005 -0.011 0.021 -0.006 
 
(1.097) (-0.664) (0.898) (-0.315) 
Male -0.002 -0.002 
 
-0.001 
 
(-0.698) (-0.764) 
 
(-0.371) 
Male*Connect3 
 
0.017 -0.013 0.013 
  
(1.000) (-0.539) (0.670) 
         
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 28,407 28,407 28,407 28,407 
R-squared 0.040 0.040 0.118 0.272 
Fixed Effects Year+Industry Year+Industry Year+Industry+Analyst Year+Firm 
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Table 7 Connections and AA Election 
 
This table reports probit regression results of analysts career outcomes. The dependent variable Elected as AA is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if an analyst is elected as an All-American winner by institutional investors in a year 
and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable Promote to AA is an indicator variable that equals 1 if an analyst was not an 
AA last year and is an AA this year and 0 otherwise. Connect1 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if an analyst 
attended the same university as one of the senior officers and directors of the company and 0 otherwise. For each 
analyst-year, we treat analyst as connected if he/she has at least one connection with the firms he/she covers. Ivy 
League equals 1 if the analyst attended one of the Ivy League schools and zero otherwise. Experience is the number 
of years the analyst appears in the I/B/E/S database. Num of Ind Covered is the number of industry sectors covered 
by the analyst in the preceding year. Num of Stocks covered is the number of stocks the analysts issued earnings 
forecast on in the preceding year. Forecast error last year is the average standardized accuracy measure across all 
stocks covered by the analyst in the preceding year. Rec impact last year is the average two-day cumulative 
abnormal returns across all recommendations issues by the analyst during the preceding year. AA last year is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the analyst was an AA in the last year and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Results using Connect1 
 
Male analysts 
 
Female analysts 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 Elected as AA Promote to AA  Elected as AA Promote to AA 
Connect1 0.163 0.243 
 
0.066 0.205 
 
(2.278)** (3.475)*** 
 
(0.367) (1.034) 
Ivy League 0.078 0.039 
 
0.303 0.286 
 
(1.113) (0.595) 
 
(2.055)** (1.792)* 
Experience -0.200 -0.058 
 
0.075 0.221 
 
(-2.229)** (-0.720) 
 
(0.336) (0.947) 
Num of Ind Covered -0.268 -0.322 
 
0.090 -0.167 
 
(-2.862)*** (-3.399)*** 
 
(0.393) (-0.684) 
Num of Stocks Covered 0.376 0.454 
 
0.453 0.699 
 
(3.576)*** (4.495)*** 
 
(1.688)* (2.311)** 
Forecast error last year -1.979 -0.898 
 
-6.904 -8.751 
 
(-1.181) (-0.654) 
 
(-1.917)* (-2.544)** 
Rec impact last year 0.013 0.016 
 
-1.467 -0.869 
 
(0.019) (0.021) 
 
(-0.921) (-0.518) 
AA last year 2.808 
  
2.388 
 
 
(39.439)*** 
  
(14.977)*** 
       
Observations 6,615 7,874 
 
916 909 
Pseudo R2 0.552 0.0424 
 
0.479 0.105 
Fixed Effects Year Year  Year Year 
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Table 7 Connections and AA Election, Continued 
 
Panel B: Results using Connect2 
 
Male Analysts 
  
Female Analysts 
 
(1) (2) 
  
(1) (2) 
 
Elected as AA Promote to AA 
  
Elected as AA Promote to AA 
     
 
     
Connect2 0.124 0.158 
 
Connect2 -0.215 -0.189 
 
(1.932)* (2.552)** 
  
(-1.499) (-1.136) 
Ivy League 0.082 0.055 
 
Ivy League 0.394 0.412 
 
(1.173) (0.822) 
  
(2.720)*** (2.568)** 
Experience -0.201 -0.056 
 
Experience 0.080 0.238 
 
(-2.237)** (-0.689) 
  
(0.361) (1.032) 
Num of Ind Covered -0.265 -0.313 
 
Num of Ind Covered 0.095 -0.138 
 
(-2.849)*** (-3.326)*** 
  
(0.412) (-0.570) 
Num of Stocks Covered 0.376 0.461 
 
Num of Stocks Covered 0.501 0.768 
 
(3.555)*** (4.540)*** 
  
(1.924)* (2.599)*** 
Forecast error last year -1.930 -0.843 
 
Forecast error last year -7.737 -9.459 
 
(-1.160) (-0.625) 
  
(-2.183)** (-2.781)*** 
Rec impact last year -0.019 -0.015 
 
Rec impact last year -1.373 -0.591 
 
(-0.029) (-0.020) 
  
(-0.863) (-0.360) 
AA last year 2.805 
  
AA last year 2.393 
 
 
(39.369)*** 
   
(15.022)*** 
        
Observations 6,615 7,874 
 
Observations 916 909 
Pseudo R2 0.552 0.0397 
 
Pseudo R2 0.481 0.105 
Fixed Effects Year Year  Fixed Effects Year Year 
Panel C: Results using Connect3 
 
Male Analysts 
  
Female Analysts 
 
(1) (2) 
  
(1) (2) 
 
Elected as AA Promote to AA 
  
Elected as AA Promote to AA 
     
 
     
Connect3 0.159 0.335 
 
Connect3 -0.164 -0.368 
 
(1.620) (3.888)*** 
  
(-0.744) (-1.260) 
Ivy League 0.098 0.061 
 
Ivy League 0.345 0.398 
 
(1.442) (0.954) 
  
(2.428)** (2.587)*** 
Experience -0.211 -0.084 
 
Experience 0.070 0.217 
 
(-2.331)** (-1.025) 
  
(0.317) (0.943) 
Num of Ind Covered -0.253 -0.300 
 
Num of Ind Covered 0.083 -0.158 
 
(-2.713)*** (-3.191)*** 
  
(0.360) (-0.662) 
Num of Stocks Covered 0.394 0.477 
 
Num of Stocks Covered 0.479 0.784 
 
(3.777)*** (4.788)*** 
  
(1.838)* (2.665)*** 
Forecast error last year -1.917 -0.826 
 
Forecast error last year -7.223 -9.506 
 
(-1.149) (-0.607) 
  
(-2.031)** (-2.712)*** 
Rec impact last year -0.003 -0.068 
 
Rec impact last year -1.396 -0.626 
 
(-0.004) (-0.089) 
  
(-0.871) (-0.374) 
AA last year 2.808 
  
AA last year 2.396 
 
 
(39.429)*** 
   
(15.056)*** 
        
Observations 6,615 7,874 
 
Observations 916 909 
Pseudo R2 0.552 0.0430 
 
Pseudo R2 0.479 0.106 
Fixed Effects Year Year 
 
Fixed Effects Year Year 
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Table 8 Quality of Information  
 
This table compares the effect of connections on job performance in firms with different disclosure and information quality. Accrual Quality is constructed 
following Dechow and Dechiv (2002). It is the (negative of) standard deviation of the residual change in working capital unexplained by changes in cash flows, 
revenue and PPE in the past 5 years. 10-K Disclosure Quality measures disclosure transparency using textual analysis of 10-K filings. It is based on Li (2008) 
and obtained from Li’s website. Stock Volatility is log of one plus stock volatility. Tangibility is measured by market to book ratio. All regressions contain same 
set of controls as in Tables 4-6. All explanatory variables are standardizes as in Equation (1). Industry fixed effects is based on Fama-French 48 industry 
classification. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at analyst level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 
significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Forecast accuracy 
 
Accrual Quality 
 
10-K Disclosure Quality 
 
Stock Volatility 
 
Asset Tangibility 
 
High Low  High Low  Low High  High Low 
Connect1 -0.035 -0.019 
 
-0.038 -0.015 
 
-0.030 -0.029 
 
-0.036 -0.022 
 
(-5.749)*** (-2.025)** 
 
(-4.807)*** (-2.448)** 
 
(-4.760)*** (-4.194)*** 
 
(-6.341)*** (-3.480)*** 
Male -0.002 -0.012 
 
-0.006 -0.001 
 
-0.007 -0.005 
 
-0.004 -0.007 
 
(-0.490) (-2.956)*** 
 
(-1.364) (-0.394) 
 
(-1.544) (-1.423) 
 
(-1.556) (-1.833)* 
Male*Connect1 -0.015 -0.031 
 
-0.010 -0.032 
 
-0.017 -0.037 
 
-0.010 -0.023 
 
(-2.352)** (-3.152)*** 
 
(-1.194) (-5.087)*** 
 
(-2.476)** (-5.069)*** 
 
(-1.599) (-3.445)*** 
            
Control Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Observations 156,969 151,667 
 
133,402 133,698 
 
186,022 191,998 
 
167,585 181,036 
R-squared 0.023 0.028  0.023 0.025  0.020 0.033  0.028 0.024 
Test of interaction coefficient equality  
P-value   0.0576     0.0101     0.0057     0.0698 
Panel B: Recommendation impact 
 
Accrual Quality 
 
10-K Disclosure Quality 
 
Stock Volatility 
 
Asset Tangibility 
 
High Low  High Low  Low High  High Low 
Connect1 -0.002 0.000 
 
-0.001 0.000 
 
0.002 -0.006 
 
0.001 -0.004 
 
(-0.648) (0.002) 
 
(-0.187) (0.117) 
 
(0.819) (-1.581) 
 
(0.169) (-1.244) 
Male 0.003 0.002 
 
0.003 0.002 
 
0.002 0.000 
 
0.001 0.002 
 
(1.414) (1.028) 
 
(1.435) (0.846) 
 
(1.876)* (0.157) 
 
(0.405) (1.327) 
Male*Connect1 0.007 0.020 
 
0.007 0.016 
 
0.003 0.022 
 
0.009 0.016 
 
(1.658)* (4.313)*** 
 
(1.763)* (4.273)*** 
 
(1.373) (5.339)*** 
 
(2.427)** (4.047)*** 
            
Control Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Observations 12,354 11,621 
 
10,565 10,827 
 
14,118 15,173 
 
11,427 14,189 
R-squared 0.031 0.043  0.039 0.045  0.030 0.041  0.039 0.036 
Test of interaction coefficient equality  
P-value   0.0217     0.0996     0.0004     0.0838 
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Table 9 Young versus Old Analysts 
 
This table examines the effect of connections on job performance among young and old analysts. Young (old) analysts are defined as those with less (more) than 
five years of experience in the IBES sample. All variables, including unreported controls, are as defined in Table 4. For brevity we report regression results only 
use Model (1) in Table 4. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at analyst level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** 
indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Old Analysts  
 
Young Analysts 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
 
Connect1 Connect2 Connect3 
 
Connect1 Connect2 Connect3 
 Fore Error Fore Error Fore Error  Fore Error Fore Error Fore Error 
Connection -0.036 -0.026 -0.081 
 
-0.024 -0.012 -0.043 
 
(-4.832)*** (-3.893)*** (-2.733)*** 
 
(-3.184)*** (-1.984)** (-1.998)** 
Male -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 
 
-0.002 -0.003 -0.005 
 
(-2.304)** (-3.686)*** (-4.269)*** 
 
(-0.611) (-1.323) (-2.348)** 
Male*Connection -0.013 -0.019 -0.034 
 
-0.022 -0.026 -0.078 
 
(-1.705)* (-2.593)*** (-1.121) 
 
(-2.785)*** (-4.001)*** (-3.320)*** 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 191,946 191,946 191,946 
 
189,610 189,610 189,610 
R-squared 0.025 0.024 0.024 
 
0.023 0.022 0.022 
Fixed Effects Year+Industry Year+Industry Year+Industry 
 
Year+Industry Year+Industry Year+Industry 
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Table 10 A Placebo Test – The Wall Street Journal Top Analyst Ranking 
 
This table reports probit regression results on the Wall Street Journal’s annual analyst rankings. The specification is 
identical to Table 7. The dependent variable WSJ Top is an indicator variable that equals 1 if an analyst is ranked as 
a top analyst by the WSJ and zero otherwise. WSJ Top last year is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the analyst 
was a top analyst ranked by the WSJ in the last year and zero otherwise. All the other variables are defined under 
Table 7. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Male Analysts Female Analysts 
  (1) (2) 
 
WSJ Top WSJ Top 
      
Connect1 0.028 0.313 
 
(0.403) (1.432) 
Ivy League -0.103 -0.045 
 
(-1.489) (-0.249) 
Experience -0.052 -0.217 
 
(-0.578) (-0.890) 
Num of Ind Covered -0.013 0.645 
 
(-0.136) (2.200)** 
Num of Stocks Covered 0.513 0.758 
 
(4.702)*** (2.302)** 
Forecast error last year -2.783 -10.754 
 
(-1.785)* (-2.016)** 
Rec impact last year -0.063 1.369 
 
(-0.087) (0.642) 
WSJ Top last year 0.105 0.049 
 
(1.325) (0.220) 
    
Observations 2,698 377 
Pseudo R2 0.0308 0.121 
Fixed Effects Year Year 
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Table 11 Same-gender Connections 
 
This table examines the impact of same-gender connection on job performance. The dependent variables are 
standardized forecast error and the 2-day cumulative abnormal returns. All variables are as defined in Table 4. The 
connection measure used is Connnect1. Male-Male (Female-Female) connection is an indicator variable that equals 
one if both the analyst and the connected officer/director are male (female) and zero otherwise. Male-Female 
connection is an indicator variable that equals one if a male analyst is connected to a female officer/board member 
and zero otherwise. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at analyst level.  t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A. Regression results 
  (1) (2) 
 
Fore Error Buy CAR[0,1] 
     
Male-Male Connection -0.047 0.011 
 
(-23.385)*** (9.468)*** 
Male-Female Connection -0.039 0.002 
 
(-10.095)*** (1.041) 
Female-Female Connection -0.025 0.004 
 
(-3.248)*** (1.230) 
Male -0.007 0.002 
 
(-2.479)** (2.007)** 
All Star -0.004 0.002 
 
(-1.590) (2.216)** 
Ivy League -0.002 0.001 
 
(-0.907) (0.860) 
Experience 0.000 0.000 
 
(1.478) (2.687)*** 
Brokerage Size 0.004 0.002 
 
(1.914)* (2.562)** 
Num of Ind Covered 0.008 -0.002 
 
(3.796)*** (-1.979)** 
Num of Stocks Covered 0.005 -0.003 
 
(2.325)** (-2.971)*** 
Size -0.009 -0.002 
 
(-17.565)*** (-6.886)*** 
BTM 0.020 0.001 
 
(20.173)*** (1.946)* 
Past Returns -0.010 0.001 
 
(-28.475)*** (3.687)*** 
   
Observations 381,556 29,302 
R-squared 0.024 0.031 
Fixed Effects Year+Industry Year+Industry 
Panel B. F Tests of Equality of Coefficients 
 
Fore Error CAR[0,1] 
 
p-value p-value 
Male-Male Connection=Female-Female Connection 0.0052 0.0332 
Male-Male Connection=Male-Female Connection 0.0581 0.0001 
Male-Female Connection=Female-Female Connection 0.0618 0.6072 
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Table 12 Heckman Correction 
 
This table re-examines main regression results using the Heckman correction to account for endogeneity in analyst 
coverage. Panel A reports first stage Heckman model, where we regress percentage of female analysts covering a 
firm on female labor force participation rate in the county where company headquarter is located and other firm 
level characteristics. Panel B reports main coefficient from the second stage Heckman model, where Inverse Mill’s 
Ratio is calculated from first stage regression. Female participation rate is percentage of female participating in 
labor force at US county level from 1990 census. All other variables (including unreported controls) are the same as 
in Table 4. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at analyst level.  t statistics are 
presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
 
Panel A. First Stage Heckman 
 
(1) 
   
 
% of Female Analysts 
      
   Female participation rate 0.002 
   
 
(3.126)*** 
   Size 0.008 
   
 
(10.895)*** 
   BTM 0.006 
   
 
(3.287)*** 
   Past Returns -0.002 
   
 
(-0.841) 
        
Observations 42,964 
   R-squared 0.035 
   Fixed effects Year+Industry 
   Panel B. Second Stage Heckman 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) 
 
Fore Error Fore Error Buy CAR[0,1] Buy CAR[0,1] 
         
Connect1 -0.045 -0.030 0.009 -0.003 
 
(-23.678)*** (-5.150)*** (8.366)*** (-1.098) 
Male -0.009 -0.005 0.004 0.001 
 
(-3.320)*** (-1.630) (3.443)*** (0.708) 
Male*Connect1 
 
-0.018 
 
0.013 
  
(-2.968)*** 
 
(5.052)*** 
Inverse's Mill's Ratio 0.863 0.876 0.046 0.034 
 
(2.911)*** (2.958)*** (0.408) (0.298) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 353,195 353,195 27,621 27,621 
R-squared 0.024 0.024 0.030 0.031 
Fixed Effects Year+Industry Year+Industry Year+Industry Year+Industry 
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